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Abstract: Weber and “Kulturprotestantismus”. Max Weber’s Die protestan­
tische Ethik und der “Geist” des Kapitalismus is a “classical text” that few read 
and even fewer understand. Heinz Steinert maintained that the work could 
be understood only when readers understood its cultural context; that is, un­
derstanding what Protestantism meant to Weber and his contemporaries. 
For many of them Protestantism was superior to Catholicism, a point under­
scored in the ‘Kulturkampf ’ as well as in speeches given in honor of Martin 
Luther’s 400th birthday. Julius Köstlin, Albrecht Ritschl, Adolf Harnack, and 
Heinrich Treitschke gave the most important of these, and contributed sig­
nificantly to Weber’s understanding of, and appreciation for, Protestantism. 
Steinert may not be totally correct to insist that we read the protestantische 
Ethik as a religious pamphlet, but he is undeniably right to insist that we put 
‘protestantische’ back into Die protestantische Ethik. 
Key Words: Max Weber, Heinz Steinert, “Protestant Ethic”, ‘Kulturprotestan­
tismus’ 
Weber’s Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus is regarded as a 
“classical text”. However, Heinz Steinert has observed, “everyone knows it, but 
nobody reads it.”1 Steinert insisted that if we do read it, that we will understand it 
only if we know its historical context.2 The historical context of Die protestantische 
Ethik is, as he emphasizes, protestantisch. To understand Die protestantische Ethik we 
need to understand what Protestantism was for Weber and for Weber’s Germany. 
The critical need for this historical understanding of Protestantism is demanded 
by a reading of the very first pages. The first part is entitled “Das Problem”, but as 
Steinert observes, Weber does not begin with a statement of a problem; he begins 
by introducing “doubtful statistics” regarding the economic and social differences 
between Protestants and Catholics in Germany. These statistics are taken from the 
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recent work by Weber’s former student Martin Offenbacher regarding the south­
ern German state of Baden and are buttressed by his own, earlier research on East 
Prussia.3 These statistics are designed to show that Protestants emphasize the ethic 
of work and that Catholics do not. This belief in the superiority of Protestantism 
was not peculiar to Weber; rather, it was embedded in German culture throughout 
most of the nineteenth century. Steinert insists that to comprehend Weber’s writing, 
we need to understand its culture, meaning that we must be familiar with the rel­
evant traditions and controversies. The tradition that Steinert has in mind is ‘Kul­
turprotestantismus’ and the controversy that Steinert refers to is the ‘Kulturkampf ’. 
‘Kulturprotestantismus’ refers to the belief in the greatness of Protestant theology 
and culture. Weber insisted that he was not religious, but he was well­versed in the 
culture of German Protestantism. Weber was brought up in a Protestant household 
and he continued to be interested in Protestant religion and culture. He frequently 
published his writings in Die Christliche Welt, one of the main organs of Protestant 
political culture. At Heidelberg he was a very close friend and colleague of the Prot­
estant theologian Ernst Troeltsch and he was a member of the Eranos­Kreis, which 
was devoted to investigating religious questions.4 ‘Kulturkampf ’ refers to the great 
“Protestant offensive” in the struggle between the two Christian Confessions over 
the issue of authority: State or Church?5 While this controversy was more or less 
confined to the 1870s, its after effects were still apparent when Weber was writing 
Die protestantische Ethik.
 Steinert reminds us that while we must accept the edition of Die protestant­
ische Ethik that is found in the 1920 edition of the Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Reli­
gionssoziologie as the “definitive work”, we must also remember that it was written 
as a two­part essay during 1904 and 1905. While Weber made important additions 
to the 1920 version, it is fundamentally a turn of the century work. Consequently, 
it predates the First World War, The Russian Revolutions, and the German ones. 
Steinert also reminds us that it is centered primarily on “Arbeit als Beruf ” and insists 
that the 1920 “Vorbemerkung”, with its emphasis on Occidental rationality, “defini­
tively does not belong” to Die protestantische Ethik.6 He maintains that only by rec­
ognizing these points and understanding its context can we understand this work. 
He also insists that Weber’s writing may be clothed as a “scholarly investigation” but, 
is in fact, really a “Kampfschrift”. It is not a scientific account but is a religious pam­
phlet – one designed to show the superiority of Protestantism. Steinert may not be 
completely correct in this; but he is certainly right to insist that we put ‘protestan­
tische’ back into Die protestantische Ethik. 
It is my intention to honor Heinz Steinert by adding to his work which stresses 
the considerable importance that Kulturprotestantismus had for Max Weber. I will 
first build upon Steinert’s brief treatment of Kulturprotestantismus. Second, I will 
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add to his short discussion of Bismarck’s “Kulturkampf ”. Third, I will discuss four 
of the most important and relevant cultural speeches which were given in honor of 
Luther’s 400th birthday. The speeches were given by Julius Köstlin, Albrecht Ritschl, 
Adolf Harnack, and by Heinrich von Treitschke, one of the greatest Protestant poli­
ticians. In the fourth section, I will discuss the impact that Treitschke had on Max 
Weber. Weber had a very complex reaction to Treitschke as a man and to his think­
ing. Like his contemporaries, Weber was immersed in the discussions about Protes­
tantism and culture; but for him, Treitschke practically embodied some of the beliefs 
and values of Protestantism, culture, and politics. Consequently, nineteenth­century 
German Protestantism is one of the most important keys to unlocking the text of Die 
protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus.
Kulturprotestantismus 
The term ‘Kulturprotestantismus’ is problematic. While most scholars agree that the 
term is polemical and that it was used to justify the belief in the cultural superi­
ority of Protestantism over Catholicism, ‘Kulturprotestantismus’ does have many 
meanings.7 There is also some question about how long it has been in use; some 
trace it back to 1920 while Steinert seems to suggest its origins are more recent. His 
claim that it is more recent is supported by the fact that in the third edition of the 
six­volume Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart there is no separate entry for ‘Kul­
turprotestantismus’.8 There is also the issue of who coined the term; Friedrich Wil­
helm Graf quotes from Manfred Schick’s 1970 dissertation that the originator of the 
term has not yet been discovered.9 Finally, there is the question about the beginnings 
as well as the duration of ‘Kulturprotestantismus’, with some scholars suggesting that 
it ranged from 1900 to 1914 while others have insisted that it began about a decade 
earlier. Still others consider that ‘Kulturprotestantismus’ began as a movement when 
the Protestantenverein was first formed around 1865 while still others suggest that it 
covers an epoch; from Schleiermacher to Troeltsch.10 
It is to Schleiermacher’s credit that religion was no longer despised by the cul­
tured and the intellectuals and it is to Hegel’s credit that theology could be under­
stood historically. It is to the credit of both of them that their students took that 
posi tive interest in theology and religion and transformed it from being simply a 
matter of faith into the subject of serious scholarly concern. This was demonstrated 
in a number of ways; first, by the new journals that the students of Schleiermacher 
and Hegel founded. Although the editors and contributors to journals, such as the 
Theologische Jahrbücher and the Theologische Studien und Kritiken, held differing 
viewpoints that represented their schools; they all shared the interest in develop­
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ing an historical account of Christianity. Second, this is manifested by a number 
of historical works, such as Leben Jesu, by David Strauß, and the multi­volume his­
tory of dogma by F.C. Baur and the massive history of the Church by August Nean­
der. Third, it is shown by the existence of a scholarly encyclopedia; several scholars 
had this idea and it became the Real­Encyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und 
Kirche. This eighteen volume work was to have been under the editorship of Mat­
thias Schneckenburger, who figures prominently in Die protestantische Ethik; but his 
early death meant that his influence was restricted primarily to the first volume.11 
Fourth, scholars turned their attention to Luther’s life and work. According to Adolf 
Harnack, two of the most important treatments of Luther’s biography and theol­
ogy were the books by Julius Köstlin and Harnack’s father Theodosius.12 According 
to Theodosius Harnack, Luther had two conceptions of God: the hidden God and 
the revealed one. The first is the “deus absconditus” that will also be found particu­
larly in Calvin and, by extension, Max Weber. This Deity is the creator God who 
cannot be fathomed. This is also the Deity that Luther refers to as the “God outside 
of Christ”. This Deity is in contrast to the “God in Christ”; that is, the “Savior God”. 
The first is the God of wrath (Zorn); the second is the God of love (Liebe).13 The first 
God is the God of predestination, who out of wrath has damned people to Hell: He 
is to be feared. However, Harnack maintains that Luther gave up this unconditional 
determinism soon after 1525. Instead of maintaining that most people were eter­
nally damned, Luther now believed that God wants all to be saved. Instead of uncon­
ditional wrath there is unconditional love. This is Luther’s “anti­predestination” doc­
trine which then lays great weight on the notion of the “eternal, fatherly, grace giv­
ing” will.14 
Although Harnack’s Luthers Theologie was important and influential, the writ­
ings by Julius Köstlin were probably more important. Köstlin was partially respon­
sible for the beginning of the Weimar edition of Luther’s works as well as the later 
and much shorter Braunschweig edition.15 Besides writing all three lengthy entries 
on Luther for the Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche he also 
wrote two massive works on Luther. In his entry on Luther for the first edition Köst­
lin reasonably complained that no one had yet provided a full scientific account of 
Luther’s theology.16 Köstlin’s entry was scientific and objective; however, despite its 
40 pages in length, it was not a full account. The response to this entry was so over­
whelming that Köstlin decided to write his biographical and theological works on 
Luther. It was with some pride and a fair amount of justification that Julius Köst­
lin could claim to have offered the first complete and scientifically written Luther 
biography.17 He was referring to his two volume Martin Luther, sein Leben und seine 
Schriften. Köstlin did not intend his biography to appeal only to other scholars; he 
wrote it more for popular consumption. However, he intended his two volume work 
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Luthers Theologie to be read by educated people. This two volume work appeared in 
1863 with a second edition in 1883.
Köstlin’s Luthers Theologie can be said to be divided into three parts. Part one 
is devoted to setting out Luther’s life until approximately 1523; thereby chronic­
ling Luther’s early years. These years include his life as a monk and as a professor. 
And, they especially include his many vigorous fights against the Catholic Church. 
The second part focuses on Luther’s life from roughly 1523 until his death. Köst­
lin devotes most of this part to discussions concerning Luther’s theological disputes 
with other Reformers. The third part is Köstlin’s attempt to provide a systematic dis­
cussion of Luther’s theology.
In part one, Köstlin shows Luther’s ‘negative’ side. That is, he shows how and why 
Luther’s antagonism towards the Pope and the Church prompted him to insist on its 
radical reformation. Köstlin aptly demonstrates that Luther’s complaint was not with 
the overall practice of Indulgences; rather, he was concerned with the Pope’s own 
misuse of that practice as well as his countenance of others’ abuse of it.18 This misuse 
prompted Luther to question the Church’s authority, both in the personal form of 
the Pope and in the institutional form of the Catholic Church. As Köstlin repeatedly 
stresses, Luther’s objections were not capricious but were firmly based upon Scrip­
ture. Thus, based upon the Bible, Luther questioned the Catholic account that pro­
vided Peter with the sole authority over religious matters. In Luther’s opinion, it was 
bad enough that the Pope claimed control over both churchly and earthly realms. 
But, it was even worse in that the Pope demanded total “oriental submission”. Fur­
thermore, as an institution the Church tried to justify this use of Papal force, which 
Luther referred to as the “tyranny of the hierarchy”. In other passages, Luther is more 
specific, calling it the “Roman hierarchy”.19 Furthermore, Köstlin shows that Luther 
had not only a firm understanding of both the Old and the New Testament but of 
the Church Fathers as well. And, he used that knowledge against the abuses by the 
Pope and by the Church. Consequently, Luther had considerable respect for Moses 
and the Law; it is just that Christ and grace replaced them. Furthermore, Köstlin 
shows how much Luther understood the teachings of the Church Fathers. He shows 
how much Luther took from Augustine and from other mystics. His latter rejection 
of mysticism was only partial: he always believed in mystic’s sense of Jesus’ inner 
dwelling; he rejected the extreme subjectivity of certain mystically inclined people.20 
 Köstlin details Luther’s objections against the ‘traditional’ church practices. 
Thus, he argues against the church practice of celibacy and its refusal to allow mar­
riage. He also takes it to task for the practices of general Mass and private confession. 
He condemns the church practices of praying to the Virgin Mary and the saints for 
protection and intercession. Finally, he argues against the traditional church belief in 
Purgatory. Köstlin again underscores Luther’s contention that his arguments are not 
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merely his; rather, that they rest upon the authority of Scripture. And, the Catholic 
Church cannot claim to be a higher authority than the Bible.21 
In the third part Köstlin discusses Luther’s positive theology. Most important is 
Luther’s insistence that the sole authority is the ‘Word’, that is, Holy Scripture. Köst­
lin cites Luther’s insistence that it is better to have more faith in a lay person who 
acts in accordance to the Bible than it is to have faith in the Pope who does not. In 
Luther’s view, grace and truth belong to Jesus and not in the hand of any person.22 
The Bible is the norm and the source for how a Christian should conduct his or 
her life. The Bible is, for Luther, the ‘objective’ word of God and it contains the real 
truth.23 The Bible, according to Luther, tells us to have faith in God and that the only 
way to heaven comes through Jesus Christ. Thus, Luther discounts the importance 
of the notion of a church and he bases this in part on Jesus’ remark that where two 
or three come together that is where he will be. The church is nothing more or less 
than the community of the holy ones; that is the community of the believers.24 Köst­
lin’s account of Luther’s positive theology lacks some force; Köstlin gives a far better 
picture of Luther as critic and fighter. 
For many German theologians, Köstlin’s interpretation of Luther’s theology was 
more influential than that of Harnack. However, Harnack’s interpretation seems to 
have had more of an impact on Troeltsch. It is likely that Max Weber’s discussion in 
the Die protestantische Ethik of the two Gods relies on Ernst Troeltsch’s recommen­
dation of Harnack’s Luthers Theologie. In his important contribution on Luther and 
the modern world in Das Christentum from 1908, Troeltsch writes that in his opin­
ion, Harnack’s presentation is the best to date.25 What is odd is that Troeltsch had not 
even mentioned Harnack’s work in his discussion of Luther in his 1906 edition of 
Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit. If more people had adopted 
Harnack’s views, the ‘Kulturkampf ’ may not have been totally avoided but many of 
its ugly episodes might have been minimized.
The “Kulturkampf”
Luther’s theological concern about religious issues in the sixteenth century had 
prompted him to take issue with Church authority; by the nineteenth century poli­
tical issues were beginning to cast doubt on religious authority. While the German 
revolution of 1848 never materialized, many of the liberal sentiments that underlie 
it continued for decades. At the beginning of the 1870/1871 War there was an out­
pouring of national sentiment. Bismarck wished to take advantage of such feelings 
of unity to extend northern Germany’s influence to the south. While the Consti­
tution of 1871 was a compromise of sorts, Bismarck was able to consolidate power 
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over almost all of Germany. As Nipperdey writes, after 1871, there were two major 
issues that concerned Germans: One was the extension of the German Constitution 
from just a document to something more significant which would control peop­
les’ lives.26 The other was the “Kulturkampf ”. This was a struggle between Protes­
tants and Catholics and has been described as a conflict between state and church.27 
It revolved around the issue of authority. Which had the higher authority: the State 
or the Church? Rudolf Sohm noted that some educated Catholics strongly objected 
to the Papal claim.28 However, most German Catholics believed that they owed their 
allegiance not to Germany, but to “over the mountains” – meaning to Rome. 
Originally, the term ‘Ultramontanism’ had only a geographical meaning: “beyond 
the mountain” and it stemmed from the Middle Ages when German students would 
go “over the mountains” to study at Bologna and other schools.29 But, by 1871 it 
had begun to take on political and religious overtones. The origin of the conflict 
can be centred on the doctrine of Papal infallibility which the Vatican announced 
in July 1870.30 The doctrine was based upon the “absolute certainty” of the supreme 
wisdom of the Pope when he spoke “ex cathedra” and therefore demanded “abso­
lute respect”.31 Furthermore, this demand for absolute obedience was interpreted to 
mean obedience to the Pope in religious and moral matters, but also in every other 
matter as well. In short, the “Roman question” had to do with the resurgence in the 
belief in the Pope’s domination of the world.32 Thus, Harnack suggested that on the 
basis of the Pope’s claims, one could choose the year 1870 as the founding of the 
Papacy. The Pope had ruled over not just the Church but over the entire world in 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, so the claim was that the contemporary Pope 
wanted to do the same.33 
The term ‘Kulturkampf ’ began to circulate in 1872; the high point occurred two 
years later with assassination attempts on Bismarck’s life by Catholic supporters.34 
By the late 1870s, however, the liberal era was over and the stridency of the ‘Kul­
turkampf ’ had ebbed to some degree.35 However, the Bismarckian sense of nation 
and the belief in progress increased while Catholics continued to believe in interna­
tionalism and Papal authority.
Luther’s Commemoration
Probably the single most important year for ‘Kulturprotestantismus’ was 1883, the 
400th commemoration of Luther’s birth. This celebration was partially a reaction to 
Catholicism, but more so, it was the outpouring of immense pride in this great Ger­
man. Celebrations were held everywhere – in large cities and small towns. Virtually 
every major thinker was asked to give a speech. However, each celebration and every 
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speech needs to be considered in relation to the ‘Kulturkampf ’. That is why there is 
so much emphasis on Luther’s enormous contributions to every aspect of German 
life; not just theologically, but literary, scientifically, and even politically.
There were numerous speeches that deserve attention, but here I consider the 
four given by Köstlin, Ritschl, Harnack, and Treitschke. All four speeches empha­
sized Luther’s greatness and in varying degrees all four included defences against 
some of the Catholic charges. However, each of the four speakers stressed what he 
thought most important about Luther and his legacy.
If the other speeches were to emphasize Luther’s massive contributions to Ger­
many, Köstlin’s speech was intended to provide a far more personal picture of him. 
Despite having published the massive biography that showed Luther in all his com­
plexities as well as publishing the two­volume work treating Luther’s detailed theol­
ogy, Köstlin took pains in his speech to show that fundamentally Luther was a per­
son who believed in the good and simple German traits and who acted according 
to the dictates of his conscience. In this, he was going back to his entry on Luther 
in the first edition of the Realencyklopädie.36 Köstlin insisted that despite Luther’s 
education and despite his fame, he never forgot that he was nothing more than 
a son of a German peasant. Moreover, he never forgot that he was a man of the 
people.37 He was brought up with the belief that God was loving and merciful and 
he continued to hold that belief while he pursued his studies in philosophy. He was 
not very interested in typical disputes and he tended to approve of the values in the 
new humanism. However, the sudden death of a close friend was such a shock that 
he temporarily lost that belief and took the vows of a monk. At the Erfurt mon­
astery Luther learned that his early belief in God’s love was naïve; instead, God’s 
fundamental essence was power and will.38 Luther’s basic hope and faith in God’s 
goodness was replaced by the belief in the Church’s form and authority. But, during 
this time he also began to read the mystic Tauler and while he took from him the 
mystic’s belief in the inner striving for the union with God he rejected the mystic’s 
metaphysical inclinations as empty and abstract. In the same way, Luther objected 
to scholastic philosophy as being both too abstract and too subtle.39 Köstlin paints 
Luther’s move towards reform as a move away from that which is abstract and 
foreign to something more simple and innate. That is why Köstlin emphasizes 
Luther’s sense of conscience. When asked to recant, Luther said that he would not; 
when demanded to desist, Luther maintained that he could not. It was not a matter 
of external Church authority but was a matter of internal belief formed by his own 
reading of the Gospel. Furthermore, he rejected the attempt by anyone to substi­
tute Luther’s authority for that of the Church: “You must not be Luther’s disciple but 
Christ’s”.40 It was a matter of individual thought and faith, hence he insisted on free­
dom of conscience – claiming that “thinking is toll free”. Because Luther believed 
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that each person must listen to God, he believed it important to ensure that each 
person could read the word of God; hence his translation into simple, natural, Ger­
man.41 In his simple, truly human manner, Luther represented the simple and truly 
human German ‘Volk’ – and, this is what Köstlin wished to remind his audience.42 
The second speech to be considered was given by Albrecht Ritschl. Despite the 
great amount that Ritschl wrote on theology, his speech given on November 10, 1883 
in Göttingen, was the primary document in which he offered his portrait of Luther.43 
It is, in many ways, a true expression of Ritschl: It is powerful and personal; it is posi­
tive and critical. It begins, however, in a rather surprising way. Ritschl reminds his 
audience that there are some who think that Luther was single­handedly responsi­
ble for all modern positive developments. He cites a book published 80 years before, 
in which the author, a Frenchman by the name of Charles Villers, contended that 
Luther was responsible for modern science and the modern state. Luther was, in 
Villers’ view, one of the highest scientific authorities. Furthermore, Luther provided 
the freedom in religion, morals, and history. In fact, for Villers, we have Luther to 
thank for the entire Aufklärung (Enlightenment).44 
In Ritschl’s opinion, these are great exaggerations, as are many of the Catholic 
accusations against him. However, Protestants tend to glorify Luther’s heroic char­
acter while ignoring his personal flaws. Here, Ritschl would neither defend Luther 
against the Catholic diatribes nor go into detail over Luther’s personal problems. 
Instead, he wishes to give an account of Luther’s historical greatness. Luther never 
wanted to be regarded as a pope nor as a prophet.45 And, in regards to modern cul­
ture, Luther was not responsible for modern science or for the modern state. In fact, 
many of the impulses for the ‘revolution’ in the Church came not from Luther, but 
from the Mendicant Orders (Bettelorden) of the Church itself.46 
Luther’s greatness stems instead from his twin concerns with Christian free­
dom and Christian morality, both of which are based upon faith. Faith and trust in 
God were most important, patience and humility were also crucial.47 And, Luther’s 
greatness comes because of two worldly things that he stressed. One, instead of the 
emphasis on the Catholic doctrine of fleeing the world, Luther insisted on the impor­
tance of the world as part of God’s plan. Second, instead of the Catholic doctrine of 
the two groups – the high group of priests and low group of laymen, Luther empha­
sized the importance of work. It did not matter whether the person was engaged in 
the ‘high’ priestly Beruf or the ‘low’ Beruf of the common people; all were in the ser­
vice of God.48 
In much of the second half of the speech Ritschl provides a short account of 
Church history. He begins by emphasizing that the Reformation did not spring full 
blown out of the Medieval Church like some Athena. Like Luther himself, many 
bishops and nobles had for some time objected to the Church’s power and wealth, 
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and wanted a return to the notions of responsibility and morality. The Reformation 
was not a total break from the Church. As with the Catholic Church, a number of 
Lutheran followers believed in the importance of the individual mystical union with 
God. And, Ritschl objected to this, believing that it meant a return to the world­flee­
ing, ascetic tendencies of the Catholic Church.49
Unfortunately, the Catholic Church, the ‘Ultramontanists’, had embarked on an 
intentional overcoming of the Protestant Church. For 40 years, Ritschl insisted, the 
‘Ultramontanists’ had worked to stress their type of piety.50 But, Ritschl emphasized 
that Luther did not believe that true piety was found in the philosophy and rhetoric 
of the Catholic Church. It is not the knowledge of the visible Church that is impor­
tant. Instead, what is of foremost importance is one’s personal faith and trust in 
God. Ritschl notes that without understanding this, one cannot understand Luther. 
Ritschl quotes from Luther: “If God is for us, who is against us?” Ritschl concludes 
by expressing his fervent conviction that Protestantism will be victorious.51  
The speech that Adolf Harnack gave in Gießen on November 10, 1883 would 
not have drawn as much attention as the one by Köstlin and Ritschl because he was 
not yet as famous as the others. He had yet to publish his Dogmengeschichte nor his 
Das Wesen des Christentums, but he had already made enough of a name for him­
self that his speech was bound to draw considerable interest. Like Harnack’s ear­
lier work, the title of his Luther speech indicates his scientific concern with history: 
“Martin Luther, in seiner Bedeutung für die Geschichte der Wissenschaft und der 
Bildung”. As with Ritschl, Harnack contends that Luther’s significance in science and 
education was great. Harnack counts Luther as an incomparable man and one of the 
very few people who have changed history in general and Germany in particular. 
Harnack claims that as Germans, “we speak with his words, judge by his standards, 
and we find the power of his spirit in our excellence as well as our failures.”52 In spite 
of this, Harnack asks, how well do we really know him? Is he not too great for us? Is 
he not too distant from us? Is he not too resolute for us? How can we know this man 
who was both as powerful as a hero and yet as simple as a child? Only a master could 
answer these questions; Harnack restricts himself to sketching Luther’s significance 
in culture. Yet, even here there are difficulties: Luther had not discovered something 
important, like the laws of gravitation. Nor, can one point to a single work and say, 
here is Luther, in the sense that one can consider that the Divine Comedy is Dante or 
perhaps Faust is Goethe. Only when we consider Luther in light of his religious con­
victions can one begin to understand him. His religious beliefs were the secrets and 
the strengths of his life. This meant dealing with the questions concerning the pur­
pose and the goal of human life.53  
For Harnack, Luther’s impact on science was only indirect; but, that is not to 
say that it was minimal. In fact, Harnack insists that it was maximal. To show this, 
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Harnack suggests that we look back to the beginning of the Fifteenth century. At that 
time the Church was the fundamental power ruling almost everything. For almost 
a thousand years the “dogmatic system” had scarcely changed. As Augustine had 
taught, so it remained. Theology was primary and all else was subservient, including 
science. Augustine taught a two­world doctrine: there is the sensible world and there 
is the spiritual one. And, while the Church maintained dominance in this world, it 
did so mostly because of its emphasis on a “world­fleeing metaphysic”. This particu­
lar type of metaphysic impeded all science.54 
As there was a doctrine of two worlds there was also a doctrine of two truths. 
One truth was valid for theology and the other was valid for philosophy. But, the 
philosophical ‘truth’ was mostly a weak protest against the “irrationality of Church 
dogma”. As things had been, so they seemed destined to be forever. Harnack sug­
gests that someone might wish to object to this picture because it appears to ignore 
the role of the Renaissance. But, he addresses this: while the Renaissance gave us the 
Humanists and rediscovery of antiquity, it did not give us a way to a newly powerful 
morality or a means to discover the boundary lines between faith and knowledge, 
between spirit and nature, and between beauty and truth. 55
It was Martin Luther who gave us these; he rejected the philosophical and mysti­
cal conceptions of God, and he embraced the notion of the living God. No manner 
of Churchly asceticism could lead us to God; instead, it was a matter of free, indi­
vidual faith. However, this freedom was not an “empty emancipation” or a freedom 
for some ‘subjectivity’. Rather, it was the recognition of our subservience to God and 
with that a freedom from all earthly laws. In the love of God we find the highest law 
and the meaning of our lives.56 
With Luther’s rejection of Church dogma and his demonstration that the Church 
was not infallible, it appeared that the foundation of civilization was foundering. 
This was enormously significant, because it meant not only the break with the 
Church of the Middle Ages, but it also meant a return to the source. Instead of plac­
ing his trust in the Church, Luther placed his faith in the Word of God. That had 
additional implications: this knowledge of God and Christ was not based upon some 
empty letters, but upon the living Gospel. It also meant certainty for the worldly 
orders of marriage, family, state and Beruf.57 It now meant that religious author­
ity was not something external and that the state was no longer to be regarded as a 
necessary form of force. Quoting Goethe, it meant that “we have again the courage 
to stand with firm feet on God’s earth”.58 Finally, it meant that we have freedom and 
responsibility in our Beruf, no matter what it is. Luther’s clear and living convictions 
mandated a whole range of new ideas: his people, his church, his education. For 
Harnack, Luther was not merely a man; “He was the Reformation”. In Harnack’s clos­
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ing remarks, he insisted that Luther was the personal embodiment of all that is great 
and powerful and enduring and that Luther will remain the ideal for all time.59 
Heinrich von Treitschke’s speech was entitled “Luther und die deutsche Nation” 
and on first glance it may not seem as focused on religion as the other three. How­
ever, he speaks just as passionately as the others about Luther’s religion, comparing 
Luther’s conversion to Paul’s ‘metanoia’ and he regards Luther’s theological conflicts 
with the Church as parallel to those of Jesus against the Pharisees.60 He underscores 
Luther’s fight against the Church’s rigidity, its false dogma, and the numerous abu­
ses by the Church. He praises Luther’s commonsense and his belief in the good­
ness of the world and the work of the common man.61 He focuses on Luther’s rela­
tion to God and claimed that with “childlike trust” he built his belief on the power 
of God’s word alone. Treitschke also emphasizes Luther’s Germanness in quoting 
his claim “For my Germans am I born, they I wish to serve” (für meine Deutschen 
bin ich geboren, ihnen will ich dienen.)“ This is also indicated by Luther’s determi­
nation to have God speak to Germans in German.62 Treitschke places most of his 
emphasis on Luther’s importance in history and culture; it was Luther who intro­ 
duced modernity, not the Italian poets and painters. It was Luther who was respon­
sible for the modern German state. Although Luther was not a politician, he was 
politically astute enough to help bring about the German nation in a manner that 
was more peaceful and required less force than anywhere else.63 This he did by hel­
ping to break the state away from the Church’s dominance and by supporting the 
sovereignty of the state. It was a matter for the state to determine laws, to regu­
late loans, and to care for the poor. These were political duties and no longer fell 
under the province of the Church. The individual was also freed from Church autho­
rity; for Luther, one obeyed one’s own conscience. Treitschke pays special tribute to 
Luther’s demand for the “autonomy of conscience”, and this was in keeping with the 
recent emphasis by Protestant theologians on the moral imperative for freedom of 
conscience.64 As Treitschke noted, it was unfortunate that not every German could 
participate in this celebration of Luther: Catholics will not, and could not, grasp the 
greatness of Luther’s spirit, a spirit which fills the air of the State, society, home, and 
science. Treitschke contrasts the freedom to think and decide for one’s self with the 
stifling stench that comes out of the Lügenstübchen of the Vatican.65 Treitschke does 
have hope – German Catholics are still German and they share many of the funda­
mental traits and virtues of all Germans. In this respect they are far closer to the 
German Protestants than they are to their fellow Spanish believers. And, he be lieves 
that the day will come when all Germans will honor Martin Luther, Germany’s hero 
and teacher.66    
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Weber and Treitschke 
There are many reasons to link Weber and Treitschke: Treitschke was a frequent visi­
tor to the Weber house in Berlin, when Max was young. Max often mentioned him 
in his letters to his cousin, Otto Baumgarten. Otto’s own father had been on close 
terms with Treitschke before breaking with him. Later, Max attended Treitschke’s 
lectures in Berlin.67 Then there are the similar traits: the love of scholarship and the 
passion for nationalism. It would not be a great exaggeration to suggest that, with the 
exception of Bismarck himself, Treitschke represented the best and the worst of Ger­
man nationalism and its connection to German Protestantism. Given these reasons, 
it seems odd and even unfortunate that we lack a serious study comparing Weber 
and Treitschke: two German giants.
What we do have is mostly psychological speculation. Arthur Mitzman suggest ed 
that Treitschke was like a father figure, against whom young Max rebelled. Mitz­
man argues that Max fought against the “cynical ruthlessness” of those two ‘despots’: 
Max Sr. and Treitschke.68 More recently, Joachim Radkau suggested that there was a 
connection between Treitschke and Weber’s uncle Adolf Hausrath. Like Weber Sr., 
Hausrath defended Treitschke and they all seemed to express German chauvinism.69 
While studying in Heidelberg Max would occasionally visit his uncle, but relations 
between the two never seemed to be very good. 
We know from Weber’s early letters that he had a mixed opinion of Treitschke. 
On the one hand, in a letter to his cousin Fritz Baumgarten Weber wrote that 
Treitschke’s Deutsche Geschichte was a “true joy” and, in a later letter to his mother 
he expressed his anticipation of the second volume.70 On the other hand, he was con­
cerned about Treitschke’s lack of scholarly objectivity; as indicated in a letter that 
Max wrote to Hermann Baumgarten.71 Baumgarten was a critical influence on the 
young Weber, with Radkau going so far as referring to him as Weber’s political men­
tor. Radkau also suggests that Weber’s emphasis on separating politics from scholar­
ship has its origins in Baumgarten’s writings.72 After volume two of Treitschke’s 
Deutsche Geschichte appeared Baumgarten published a short and highly critical 
work called Treitschkes Deutsche Geschichte. Baumgarten objects to Treitschke’s pro­
nounced subjectivity and his political activity. For Treitschke, history is not a goal 
but is simply a means to win over the reader to his specific view of the present. For 
Treitschke is not an historian, but a party man and publicist, so truth and objectiv­
ity do not matter. Baumgarten believes that nothing worse could happen to Ger­
man education than if this attempt to draw students into the party struggles of the 
day becomes widespread.73 Marianne Weber wrote how as a student Weber wit­
nessed first­hand the enormous power that Treitschke’s demagoguery had on young 
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people. Weber was twenty­three years old when he listened to Treitschke as he tried 
to politicize his listeners and to persuade them of Bismarck’s greatness and to warn 
them about the influence of the Jews.74 In this conflict between Baumgarten and 
Treitschke, Weber sided with Baumgarten. In a letter to his father, Max recounted 
a visit where Hausrath attacked Baumgarten, insisting that one could make dozens 
of Baumgartens out of one Treitschke. Max wrote how he attempted to defend his 
uncle Hermann from his uncle Adolf, but that he was fearful that Adolf was going 
to turn his attack totally on him.75 Like Baumgarten, Weber objected to Treitschke’s 
blurring the line between scholarship and partisanship – in his lectures on state and 
church he propagandized for his values. Marianne wrote how Weber learned from 
that experience; he resolved never to allow himself to blur the lines between poli­
tics and scholarship and that he would refrain from substituting subjective values 
for objective facts. In Wissenschaft als Beruf Weber objects to those who bring their 
values into the lecture hall, where there is no possibility of criticism. The ones who 
do are not teachers, but demagogues; people who want to be leaders.76 When he said 
that, Weber was likely remembering Treitschke. For Treitschke, there was nothing 
wrong in what he did; he condemned what he called “bloodless objectivity” and he 
objected to the misuse of the stance “Sine ira et studio”.77 In contrast, Weber makes 
much of the importance of “sine ira et studio” in scholarship. In fact, it ranks among 
his fundamental principles of scholarship. This does not mean that Weber always 
followed his own advice. Anyone reading his speeches recognizes that he is prone to 
overstep his distinction between facts and values. An example of this is his Freiburg 
Antrittsrede, where his passionate nationalism overshadows his cool scholarship.78 
Anyone reading his writings will also notice that he often exaggerates his thesis and 
overstates his case. Examples of this can be found in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 
where he announces the difference and then concedes that it is not as hard and fast 
as he had first indicated.79 Maybe the differences between Weber and Treitschke are 
not as pronounced as Weber might have liked. But, one could claim that Treitschke 
represented one part of the legacy of ‘Kulturprotestantismus’, the side that was sub­
jective, and idealized German culture and tradition. One could insist further that 
Weber represented the other side, the side that valued scholarship, progress, and tol­
erance. There is no doubting though that Treitschke thought there was absolutely 
nothing wrong in misusing scholarship in the service of Germany. And, there is cer­
tainly no question that Weber believed that this practice was intellectually dishonest 
and that it was morally reprehensible to do.
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